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My aim here is to defend the plausibility of 
identifying the subject of human rights through the concept 
of ‘moral person’, by reflecting on the inherent connection 
between the concept of person and that of human rights in 
their moral dimension, that is in the light of an ‘ethics’ of 
human rights, an ethics in which human rights represent 
the fundamental moral values.  
I will speak of the ‘moral dimension’ of the concept 
of person to stress the difference between this dimension 
and the ‘legal dimension’ of the concept of person, which 
refers not only to individual human beings, but also to 
social units and, in being so applied, presupposes the 
existence of a body of law. This because in the legal 
dimension the person, from the analogy with the mask 
used by classical actors during performance and, 
therefore, with the character they represented, is 
conceived first and foremost as an ‘agent’ that responds 
publicly for its own actions and its own choices.  
While, in its moral dimension, the concept of 
person, presupposing ‘only’ a moral evaluation of life and 
the condition for dignity and respect in the context of social 
interaction and cooperation, is not co-extensive with that of 
an agent who is accountable for actions and has rights and 
responsibilities. As we shall see, it is the capability to 
‘communicate’ (actively but even passively), to appreciate 
the value of otherness and not the capability to act morally 
or rationally, that represents the pre-eminent value of the 
person as authentic subject of human rights. The 
unsuccessful distinction between these two dimensions of 
the concept of person, from my point of view, is one of the 
major causes of misunderstanding about the role the 
concept of person can play as ‘the subject of human 
rights’. 
It has been observed that, “if we think of a person 
as [...] a creature possessed of inherent moral dignity, [we 
have] a theory that begins with, and always centres on, the 
person and his or her inherent dignity. Human rights 
establish and protect the social conditions necessary for 
the effective enjoyment of moral personality” (J. DONNELLY, 
1985, p. 31). And in 1966 the International Covenant on 
civil and political rights recognized that ‘human rights 
derive from the inherent dignity of the human person’.  
But we could say also the other way round, that 
human rights represent the set of conditions in which a 
moral subject can identify and exercise his or her 
‘personality’ in a conscious way. It is this second way that 
will be defended here: as J. Locke argued, the term person 
stands for ‘a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and 
reflection and can consider itself the ‘same’ thinking thing, 
in different time and places’. And, in our perspective, the 
person can consider itself the ‘same’ thinking thing only by 
means of human rights, only by means of an ethics in 
which human rights represent the fundamental moral 
values.  
This is not a new argumentation (after all, it gives a 
lot to the reflections of classical authors like Cicero – in his 
elaboration of the Greek concept of ‘persona’ -, J. Locke, 
D. Hume and, today, of authors like Dennett, A.I. Melden 
and B. Ackerman), but its plausibility can be confirmed by 
referring to the fact that the concept of moral person, 
conceived in his/her capability to ‘communicate’, to 
appreciate the value of otherness and not the capability to 
‘act’ morally or rationally, seems to be a concept not too 
thin and not too tick, that is a concept by means of which 
we try to avoid the current criticisms against the adoption 
of ‘person’ as the subject of human rights – or too much 
entities are persons or too less human beings are persons. 
 
1 It is commonly said that human rights are those 
universal rights one has simply because one is a human 
being. Anyway, besides their universality, the essential 
characteristic of human rights seems to be their moral 
‘status’: the exact import of this status is unclear, but at 
least it suggest they represents basic moral values in the 
life of humans, high-priority norms, strong enough as 
normative considerations to prevail in conflicts with other 
norms, less strong and less valuable. 
Human rights are distinguished also by their moral 
‘weight’, their existing independently of recognition or 
implementation in the customs or legal systems of 
particular countries.  
Human rights are weaker than positive rights only 
in terms of implementation; their moral force, usually, is 
stronger, precisely because, even if they may not be 
‘effective’ rights until legally implemented, they exist as 
moral standards of argument and criticism independently 
of legal, cultural or conventional implementation. 
It is in this way that we can speak of an ethics of 
human rights, as a way to guarantee the integrity and the 
autonomy of persons with respect to power and positive 
laws. Because of this, it becomes difficult to avoid referring 
to the concept of person to clearly understand what human 
rights and their defense really mean; and it seems 
plausible to suppose that the identification of the subject of 
human rights should be done on moral grounds.  
Anyway, the importance of the notion of person for 
human rights could emerge better from a comparison with 
the concepts of individual, human being, and self, 
commonly used to indicate the same ontological entity, a 
biological, social and self conscious being, but with distinct 
meanings, accordingly to their use. When used to refer to 
human rights, what concept exhibits the best use?   
If we refer to ordinary language, we find that the 
term person is commonly used by people as the singular 
noun, which refers to another specific being of the same 
biological species. This means that in its ordinary use the 
term is understood though underdefined. But to show why 
to prefer the concept of person for human rights we must 
clarify the meaning and value of interrelated concepts like 
that of individual, human being and self (that represent 
different modes under which people are understood). 
As known, reference to the term ‘individual’, as a 
distinctive feature of the liberal tradition, holds a place of 
priority in the understanding of human rights. As noticed 
above, the Universal Declaration claims that human rights 
appeal directly to the ‘integrity of the individual’, which 
could be translated in the respect for the separateness of 
individuals. 




But today, it seems that the principle of the 
separateness is better sustained by means of pluralism. 
Today, in fact, the appeal to human rights has tempered 
the individualism of classical theories of natural rights and 
people are conceived as members of families, of groups 
and communities, not as isolated individuals who must be 
given reasons for entering civil society. In the Universal 
declaration we read, for example, that ‘the family is the 
natural and fundamental group unit of society and is 
entitled to protection’. 
But we must consider that critics of the ethics of 
human rights very often refer to individualism to say that it 
represents a morality that does not recognize any intrinsic 
value in any collective good. Using the term ‘individual’ to 
indicate the subject of human rights, then, could be 
criticized in so far as this is the age in which the 
separateness of people is better defended through the 
appeal to pluralism, to the respect of the integrity of 
various and different unities and their goods, like groups 
and communities, which are separate, but inserted in an 
articulated system of social interaction, reciprocation and 
global communication. 
And we may take the separateness as something 
similar to a principle of equality, a principle not requiring 
equal treatment, but requiring that different - plural - 
matters regarding people being treated with equal regard.  
Can we obtain anything better using the concept of 
‘human being’? Fundamentally, the concept of human 
being represents a way of understanding individuals as 
biological entities. For this reason, in ordinary language we 
find the conviction that one need not do anything special in 
order to hold human rights, because they are the rights 
one has simply because one is a human being. But, to 
identify the subject of human rights with the ‘human being’ 
as such is simply to commit us to ‘speciesism’, the famous 
prejudice, pointed out by P. Singer, toward the interests of 
members of one’s own species and against those of other 
species (P. SINGER, 1963), and to ‘biologism’, as pointed 
out by B. Williams, that is to identify the human species 
only trough biological criteria (B. WILLIAMS, 1986).   
Also, it seems that for a human entity to count as a 
person it is not enough for it to be identified as a member 
of a particular species, that is, the meaning of the term 
person is not co-extensive with the meaning of human 
being. We must refer to something else than our biological 
identity.  
The same we can say for the word ‘self’. It seems 
that the self represents the ‘internal’ experiential nature of 
an individual. But private experience is not enough to be a 
subject of human rights. 
The subject of rights, therefore, does not seem to 
be either a biological unit, or a ‘solipsistic’ unit, but rather 
the individual in so far as he or she is a moral, rational, 
communicative and social entity, a holder of values such 
as dignity and freedom, that is in so far as he or she is a 
person. As I. Melden writes, “the concept of a person is the 
concept of an individual human being whose features 
enable him to join some segments of his life with others” (I. 
MELDEN 1977, p. 227). 
 
2 What does it mean to be a ‘person’? As Hume 
noticed, humans are in a situation in which there is a 
scarcity of resources and a strong need for cooperation 
and reciprocation. It is in this sense, I think, that a person 
can be conceived as ‘an individual human being whose 
features enable him to join some segments of his life with 
others’. But what does it mean exactly this definition? What 
is primarily necessary to ‘join some segments of our life 
with others’? 
The Greek etymological origins of the term person 
seem to give us important suggestions here. As known, 
person derives from the classical Greek term ‘persona’, the 
mask dressed by actors in the Greek tragedy to conceal 
their identity and, at the same time, to exhibit their 
character.    
In its origins, then, and after in the Latin culture, 
the term person was peculiarly a cultural term, 
ambivalently situated between concealing and showing, 
but at the same time very rich in content, indissolubly 
linked to the dimension of ‘recognition’ and relation among 
the various persons. 
To understand the meaning and value of human 
rights today, then, it could be useful to restate the semantic 
extension the term person had achieved in the reflections 
of Latin thinkers, above all with Cicero. It was Cicero, in 
fact, by stressing not only the aspect of concealing, but 
first and foremost the aspect of recognition and 
relationship among masks who reciprocally interact and 
reveal themselves, that conferred to the term person its 
most valuable extension. With Cicero, the term person 
plainly assumes the moral connotation we need today: 
person becomes the symbol of the most dialectical form of 
communication individuals can exhibit in their social 
interaction, representing at the same time ‘the delicate 
meeting point of the decisive elements for the moral 
destination of human life’. Individuals, becoming moral 
persons, appreciate the value of otherness and, at the 
same time, reveal themselves; in a reciprocal 
communication, they can ‘feel’ the others directly in their 
interiority and can join some segment of their life with 
them. 
 
3 Thus, the moral dimension of the concept of 
person appears in all its clarity. With respect to the concept 
of self, that of person is characterized by a strongly social, 
communicative dimension and not a ‘solipsistic’ one; with 
respect to the concept of human being, it appeals to the 
value of dignity, to moral possibilities, to the moral nature 
of human existence, and not only to the biological nature; 
with respect to the concept of individual, finally, it is 
capable of mediating between public and private, between 
selfish and collective demands.  
From this perspective, we can also avoid that the 
notion of person become a factor of discrimination within 
the human species. It is precisely in the communicative 
and relational dimension of the moral dimension of the 
concept of person, in fact, in the ambiguity that is also 
extreme potentiality, between concealing and showing, 
being and appearing, that lies the moral force of the 
person, and not only in its identification with a moral or 
rational agent. 
This means that the ‘moral’ concept of person, 
contrary particularly to the ‘legal’ concept of person, is not 
co-extensive with that of an agent, that is, one who is 
accountable for actions and has rights and responsibilities. 
It is the capability to communicate (actively or passively), 
to appreciate the value of otherness and not the capability 
to act morally or rationally, that represents the pre-eminent 
value of the person as authentic subject of human rights. 
It is in this sense that we say that the concept of a 
moral person is ‘the concept of an individual human being 
whose features enable him to join some segments of his 
life with others’. 
From this perspective, therefore, the notion of 
moral person is, potentially at least, anything but a factor of 
discrimination for the human species, a concept not too 
thin and not too tick.  
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